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1. INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The present study is concerned with the use of implied language in English. One of the 
aims of this research project is to investigate how Pragmatics can play a very important 
role in the field of Discourse Analysis. “Pragmatics is a branch of linguistic studies that 
examines the relationship between the signs and people who use them; that is to say, 
how and why a specific sign is used by an individual and how do other speakers 
interpret these signs” (Renkema, 2004: 37).  
Why is it so important? Over the years, the importance of the role of the context 
in the interpretation of a message has been studied and it has been discovered that there 
is too much more information that can be taken from discourse than which is mentioned 
explicitly. This is the main role of Pragmatics, and it is closely associated to what this 
investigation is going to be about.  
This project is going to be divided into two parts. First of all, there will be a 
theoretical part whose aim it is to provide a short introduction to the history of 
Discourse Analysis and an illustration of some theoretical terms, such as discourse, 
pragmatics, reference, inference, implicature, presupposition and entailment, explained 
by different linguists, such as Austin, Brown and Yule, Grice and Renkema, among 
others. Within this theoretical part, first, the origins and evolution of Discourse Analysis 
will be explained, and also the influence of a related discipline, Pragmatics, in the 
former one. Then, terms such as reference and inference are going to be explained, since 
understanding them is the basis of the project. To continue, an explanation of the terms 
mentioned before (entailment, presupposition and implicature) will be provided, 
organising them into semantic and pragmatic inferences. In this part, an attempt will be 
made to establish a distinction among all of them, and to explain the most relevant 
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features and properties that differentiate ones from others, illustrating them with the use 
of examples.  
Secondly, with a view to tackling the relevance of the theory of implicit language 
in real life, a case study will be carried, and it will consist of an analysis of parts of the 
conversations in the American TV series, Atypical, which is based on the life of an 18-
year-old-boy, Sam Gardner. In this analysis, a distinction will be made among some 
instances of entailments, presuppositions and implicatures, which are some of the most 
relevant inference generating mechanisms. By analysing the dialogues in this TV series, 
it is intended to demonstrate that everything explained in the theoretical part of the 
project is also applied in real life conversations, since oral examples and, more 
specifically dialogues, are a clear instance of contexts where implied language can be 
found more easily.  The examples provided in this last part are going to be classified in 
the same order and following the same arrangement than the theoretical part.  
Another main concern of linguists is to investigate on how we communicate with 
each other and how discourse is ordered to create a well-developed message. 
Communication is not only connected to words and their conventional meaning, it is 
also associated with the context in which these words are set and also with the 
participants’ intentions in the communicative exchange.  
The topic of implied language seems very interesting to me, since I always wanted 
to work on how a message can be understood in different ways depending on the 
background, and how human brains work in such a way that we can understand 
information that is beyond the literal meaning of the words. This process is quite 
different if we talk about a computer system, a processor that cannot decipher certain 
messages if they are not directly -literally- conveyed, and that cannot understand certain 
6 
 
relations between propositions if these propositions are not linked explicitly by the 
means of, for instance, a conjunctive adjunct such as therefore. This project also seeks 
to better understand real differences between signalled, explicit or marked relations (He 
quit the job because he was tired of working long hours) and unsignalled, implicit or 
unmarked ones (He quit the job. He was tired of working long hours). In the first 
example, it is directly said (notice the use of because) that he quit the job by reason of 
the long hours. Conversely, in the second example, it is directly said that he was tired of 
the long hours, but it is not directly said that this was the reason why he quitted the job.  
These differences and their explanation will be explained throughout the project, 
for the main objective of the present document is to analyse through these examples 
how discourse, and more specifically implied language, can be applied to real examples, 
focusing on the use of entailments, presuppositions and implicatures. This will -it is 












2. INTRODUCTION TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Discourse Studies is a field that investigates language beyond the sentence level 
(Tannen, 2007: 5). Therefore, it is necessary to understand the fact that it is the study of 
language in use and of the inseparability between the form and the purpose of 
communication. Quite often, the context in which a message is located plays a crucial 
role for the development and understanding of a message, since there is information 
surrounding the message that can be understood only with the help of its context.  When 
a speaker says Could you please close the window?, the hearer must infer that the 
speaker does not want to know necessarily whether he has the ability of closing the 
window or not; it must be presupposed that what he wants the hearer to do is to close 
the window (because he may be cold or he may be bothered by the noises coming from 
outside, for instance, although nothing of this is overtly expressed). At the same time, it 
is deduced that there is an open window in the place where the communicative 
exchange is maintained. The inseparability between language and context is, therefore, 
one of the main aspects that have to be taken into account when we talk about Discourse 
Analysis. It describes patterns of language in texts and establishes a connection between 
language and its social and cultural context (Paltridge, 2012: 3).  
The history of Discourse Analysis is closely related to the disappearance of an 
ancient discipline: Rhetoric. Rhetoric had a high importance during the Middle Ages; 
however, it started to lose this relevance during the 19
th
 century, which led to a parallel 
increase in the study of different fields of humanities and grammar, such as Discourse 
Analysis (Van Dijk, 1985: 1).  
Zellig Harris was the first linguist that introduced the term Discourse Analysis, 
and he described it as “a way of analysing connected speech and writing” (Harris, 1952: 
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3). He was interested in the connection that the linguistic behaviour has with the non-
linguistic one and in examining the role of language beyond the sentence or utterance 
construction. Thus, he can be known as one of the pioneers of this discipline.  
John Langshaw Austin (1962) was one of the precursors of this discipline, 
together with Paul Grice (1975) and John Searle (1970). He, Austin, investigated the 
expressions of language and concluded that they might be seen as acts. He established a 
distinction between three different types of actions:  
We first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which together we 
summed up by saying we perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to 
uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, and which again is roughly 
equivalent to ‘meaning’ in a traditional sense. Second, we said that we also perform 
illocutionary acts such as informing, warning, etc, i.e. utterances which have a certain 
(conventional force). Thirdly, we may also perform perlocutionary acts: what we bring 
about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, and even say 
surprising or misleading. (Austin, 1962: 108)  
These lines lucidly demonstrate this distinction, which is really interesting since it 
allows us to establish a connection between the form and meaning of speech acts and to 
understand the difference between these three types of actions, taking into account that 
some of them are simply an utterance (locution) and the rest of them go beyond the act 
of pronouncing a sentence (illocution and perlocution).   
As a consequence, locutionary acts, taking into account Austin’s Theory of 
Speech Acts, are those related to the production of speech, with certain marks, words or 
grammatical rules (Horn and Ward, 2004: 54). An example of locutionary act would be 
the following: There is a party tomorrow. In this sentence the speaker only states a 
reality about an event.  Secondly, illocutionary acts are actions which a speaker realises 
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at the same time as he utters them. An instance of these kinds of acts is: I promise that 
tomorrow I will go out. By pronouncing this utterance, the speaker is also promising 
that he will go (which is an extra-linguistic action). Finally, perlocutionary acts have an 
effect on the addressee; they are realised as a consequence of doing something 
(convince, threaten, etc). They refer to the effects produced in the hearer. An example 
would be the following: He persuaded me to go out tomorrow- if he goes.  
Consequently, Discourse Analysis plays a very important role in the wide field of 
grammar, since people who analyse discourse have to investigate what language is used 
for (Brown and Yule, 1983: 1). It can be considered one important branch of grammar 
that, together with Pragmatics, analyses the role of a message in a particular context. 
Throughout this project, an attempt will be made to analyse more in depth the role of 
Pragmatics in Discourse Analysis through examples, and to ascertain that there are 
much more examples than those we may imagine, since discourse is full of information 











3. THE ROLE OF PRAGMATICS IN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Once a definition of the term and an explanation of the history of Discourse Studies 
have been established, another important discipline which needs to be discussed is 
Pragmatics. The connection between language and the context that surrounds it is called 
Pragmatics. It studies, as said before, the context-dependent aspects of meaning and it is 
conventionally taken to have been initiated in 1970 by Morris, Carnap and Peirce (Horn 
and Ward, 2004: xi). 
Some scholars argue that the field of Pragmatics really helps to understand the 
function of Discourse Analysis, and that they are two closely related disciplines. 
Cameron argues (2001: 38): “The relationship between linguistic form and 
communicative function is of central interest in the area of pragmatics and is highly 
relevant to the field of Discourse Analysis.” That is to say, both fields share a common 
role and it is to study the connection between what it is said and what it is understood. 
In the example of the window mentioned above, what is said by the speaker is a request 
for closing the window; nevertheless, what had to be understood by the hearer was, for 
instance, the fact that the speaker was cold because the window was open.   
As a consequence, Pragmatics, since it is the relationship between the meaning 
and the context, also analyses the boundaries between what is said by the speaker and 
what is understood by the hearer, which is strongly connected with the following 
quotation: “Speakers implicate, hearers infer” (Horn and Ward, 2004: 6). Sometimes, 
the message a hearer deduces is different from what a speaker tends to implicate, as in 
the previous example. Grice characterised this term to describe examples in which what 




3.1.The Principle of Local Interpretation 
Closely connected to Pragmatics, The Principle of Local Interpretation allows the 
interlocutor to establish a relation between an utterance and the context that surrounds 
it. These entities may not have a semantic relation; however, due to this principle, it is 
easier to draw a connection between them.  
This principle instructs the hearer not to construct a context any larger than he needs to 
arrive at an interpretation. Thus if he hears someone say ‘Shut the door’ he will look 
towards the nearest door available for being shut. (If that door is shut, he may say ‘It’s shut’ 
rather than consider what other doors are potentially available for being shut (Brown and 
Yule, 1983: 59). 
The following example (The baby was crying. His mother picked him up) is 
formed by two apparently unrelated utterances. If we take each sentence separately, 
there will not be a clear connection between them; nonetheless, we assume that him 
refers to the baby crying and that his mother picked him up in order for him to stop 
crying. Therefore, we can draw a connection between the two sentences. Another 
example would be: A man and a woman sitting in the living room… the man is bored 
and goes to the window… goes out… goes to a club. In this example, we as hearers have 
to interpret that when the man gets closer to the window he is still in his living room, 
inside the house; however, the action of going to the club entails the fact of leaving the 
living room, and even the house. “Knowledge of the world tells us that houses which 
contain living rooms do not usually contain bars” (Brown and Yule, 1983: 61) In this 
example it is clearly notorious why and how the context of the message and members of 
a communicative exchange’s shared knowledge are important in the interpretation and 




4. IMPLIED LANGUAGE: INFERENCES AND REFERENCES 
Having explained the preliminary concepts related to Discourse Analysis and the study 
of Pragmatics, it is necessary to explain the main body of the dissertation: the 
theoretical part related to the use of implied information in English language. First of 
all, some definitions of the word implied will be provided so as to analyse its role into 
the pragmatic field: 
Suggested but not directly expressed; implicit. (Oxford Dictionary) 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/implied  
If something is implied, it is understood to be true or to exist, although it is not stated 
directly or in a legal agreement. (Cambridge Dictionary) 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/implied  
Hinted or suggested; not directly expressed. (Collins Dictionary) 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/implied  
Thus, what is implied is not literally said by the speaker but rather interpreted by 
the hearer. That is to say, the speaker simply utters a message that can be understood by 
the interlocutor in many different ways depending on several factors, such as the way in 
which the interlocutor communicates the message, the message itself or the context. 
This is tied to the distinction made before: “Speakers implicate, hearers infer” (Horn 
and Ward, 2004: 6). Closely related to implied language, the term inference appears, 
holding such an important connection with the former. According to Brown and Yule 
(1983: 33) people are able to reach a conclusion from a proposition owing to a process 
of deductive inference. Focusing on the example It is windy. My umbrella will break we 
can infer that both sentences hold a connection and that the fact of being windy will 
cause the breakup of the umbrella because it would not resist the strength of the wind. 
Gillian Brown and George Yule (1983: 45) proposed another example focusing on the 
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fact that one unique sentence could imply more than one message: Quite often, about a 
month actually I come up to see my children. From this message there can be selected 
several deductive inferences. The first one is that the speaker has children; therefore, 
he/she cannot be a kid (at least, he is adult enough to have children). The speaker does 
not live in the same place as his/her children, because it is said that he/she comes to visit 
them (implying that they do not live together). Furthermore, due to the use of “quite 
often, about a moth” it is implied that the speaker does not visit his/her children every 
day. Finally, depending on the age of the speaker, interpretations of that message may 
vary: if the speaker is 75, then children would live alone since they may be independent; 
if the speaker is 35, the couple might be divorced, implying that children live either with 
their mother or with their father. However, the only thing that we can take explicitly 
from the context is the fact that the speaker goes to see his children quite often. There is 
another example, quite similar, by Horn and Ward (2004), in which a speaker says: “My 
garden is poor this year”. The hearer of this message can interpret via deductive 
inferences several conclusions from this statement. The first inference could be related 
to drought or cool weather. It also can be an inference related to the lack of interest and 
the carelessness of the owner of the garden. These two inferences are not yet confirmed 
by the speaker, whose only explicit affirmation was that his garden is poor.  
According to Imanuddin (2008) inferences can be divided into semantic 
inferences or pragmatic inferences, although these two groups are not clearly 
demarcated (some of them can be both semantic and pragmatic). The former ones are 
those related to the meaning of the utterance, to the lexico-semantic significance. An 
example of semantic inferences would be the following: Booth assassinated Lincoln. 
Lincoln is dead. This is called entailment or logical consequence, a term which is going 
to be object of analysis later on.  The other type is pragmatic inferences, which are the 
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ones related not so much with the semantic part of the clause, but with the context in 
which a sentence is located, and these are the ones that characterise ordinary uneventful 
language use in a way that it often becomes even difficult to see them at work (until one 
tries to make a computer, for instance, understand language). Presuppositions and 
implicatures are clear cases in point. Presuppositions are “inferences regarding 
background assumptions against which the main import of an utterance is assessed and 
against which the utterance makes sense.” (Levinson, 1983: 167) For example, in the 
following sentence: How fast were you driving when you got the fine? it is presupposed 
that the driver got a fine, probably because he was driving too fast, although that 
information comes in the subordinate clause.   
However, entailments, presuppositions and implicatures will be subject of 
analysis later on in this project, since they are the most important inference creating 
mechanisms regarding implicit meaning; an attempt will be made to analyse semantic 
and pragmatic inferences and to provide more examples of these concepts.  
On the other hand, the phenomenon of reference is quite different from that of 
inference, and it is the following term to be analysed.  Flowerdew (2012) included 
several types of units in English that can be reference items. These items are personal 
pronouns (e.g. I, you, she); demonstratives such as that, this, etc; possessive adjectives 
(my, yours, hers, their), the finite article the, and finally possessive pronouns, such as 
mine or yours. Reference can be defined as “The relationship which holds between 
words and things is the relationship of reference: words refer to things” (Lyons, 1968: 
404). Lyons explains here that a specific word (in speech and in writing) usually has a 
referent in real life.  Starting with this brief quotation on the phenomenon of reference, 
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the different approaches that authors sustain about this notion will be explained and it is 
going to be illustrated how they differ from the one quoted before.  
To analyse this concept let us utilise the following example:  
My brother Miguel is going to study Chemistry. He is a brilliant student and Chemistry is 
one of his favourite subjects; therefore, it is going to be very easy for him. 
This fragment contains several instances of references. The personal and 
possessive pronouns he, his and him make reference to my brother Miguel, and they 
coincide in gender (masculine) and person (3
rd
 person singular). If the example was My 
sister Marta, the pronouns used would be she and her (3
rd
 person singular feminine). 
Finally, the pronoun it refers to the fact of studying Chemistry, because it does not refer 
to a living creature, unlike my brother Miguel. Brown and Yule (1983) confirmed that 
one speaker uses different expressions to refer to different individuals. For instance: 
My uncle’s coming from Canada on Sunday (…) Oh no they lived in Canada eh he was 
married to my mother’s sister. Well, she’s been dead for a number of years ago. (Brown 
and Yule, 1983: 28) 
In this text, as well as in my previous example, the speaker uses the terms my 
uncle and he to refer to a different individual than my mother’s sister and she. 
Therefore, the writer or speaker is the one that refers to something, and not the hearer or 
reader or the text itself. (Brown and Yule, 1983:28) 
Reference, therefore, according to Brown and Yule (1983), would be something 
external to us. However, these external references are not necessarily tied to our 
proximities, but rather to any element that we want to refer to, even though it is 
displaced. This is what Horn and Ward characterised as the phenomenon of aboutness 
(Horn and Ward, 2004: 74). This “displacement” can be either geographical or 
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temporal. An example of geographical displacement would be talking about the 
Antarctica, for instance, a place far away from the interlocutor’s geographical position. 
An instance of temporal displacement is to talk about the Middle Ages or the Neolithic, 
a very remote moment in history. However, there are many different interpretations for 
the term since some linguists give different meanings, such as “a kind of verbal 
“pointing to” or “picking out” of a certain object or individual that one wishes to say 
something about.” (Horn and Ward, 2004:76)  
According to other linguists such as McGinn (1981), a reference would be the 
connection between the written/spoken word and the real objects to which references 
allude to. For instance, a speaker in a conversation says: “I bought the red book. Could 
you give it to me?”  In this example, it is referring to the red book and it is a written 
word (a pronoun) that refers to an object in real life (the red book).  
Finally, Paltridge (2012: 132) defines a reference as “the situation where the 
identity of an item can be retrieved from either within or outside the text.” He 
distinguished four types of reference, depending on the situation of the reference itself 
in a given context. These types are anaphoric, cataphoric, exophoric and homophoric. I 
proceed to illustrate them in turn:  
The first type of references is anaphoric references. These are the ones whose 
referent is back in the text, “they refer back to another word or phrase used earlier in the 
text” (Paltridge, 2012: 131). An example of anaphoric reference is the following: 
“Adrian is such an intelligent guy that I always learn new things when I see him”. In 
this example, Adrian is the referent of him, and, since it appears before in the text, it is 
considered an anaphoric reference.  
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The second example of reference is just the opposite. A cataphoric reference is the 
one that alludes to an element that appears later in the text. An example of a cataphoric 
reference is: She was desperate. The night before she could lot sleep very well and she 
was very tired. Jane is a bad-tempered woman when she does not sleep more than 9 
hours. In this instance, the pronoun appears before the referent in the text (Jane), who 
appears later on, specifying who she is. As we see, the referent appears after the 
pronoun, whereas in the first case it is the other way round (the personal pronoun 
appears after the referent).  
Other instances of reference are exophoric references; they “look outside the text 
to the situation in which the text occurs for the identity of the item being referred to” 
(Paltridge, 2012: 132). This instance of reference is the one that is much more related to 
the phenomenon of aboutness explained above. For instance, in Could I borrow your 
pencil? I think that I lost mine, I put it on the desk and it disappeared, both hearer and 
speaker know the pencil they are talking about; however, it is something that transcends 
the text boundaries.  
Finally, the last instance of reference receives the name of homophoric reference. 
These are defined by Paltridge (2012: 132) and they occur “where the identity of the 
item can be retrieved by reference to cultural knowledge, in general, rather than the 
specific context of the text.” The following example is a clear case in point: The 
Industrial Revolution brought the development of the short story in North America. The 
use of the second the in this context is not the same as the typical use of the definite 
article, since in this case it does not refer to a specific short story, but to the literary 
genre in general. It means that the reader can identify this information easily; it is easily 
accessible or identifiable.  
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A follow-up study by Flowerdew (2012) was based on the classification between 
anaphoric and cataphoric reference as instances of another type of reference 
(endophoric reference). Endophoric references are those whose referent appears within 
the text. For example, Mary took the money and gave it to John.  In these cases, the 
meanings of the definitions are the same; however, they are seen as subtypes of 
endophoric references. Halliday and Hasan (1976) also followed this classification.  
 
4.1.Semantic Inferences 
As mentioned above, inferences can be divided into semantic inferences and pragmatic 
inferences. Therefore, a distinction should be made between semantics and pragmatics, 
for they are two different- yet related- fields of linguistics. On the one hand, semantics 
is related to the meaning of words, the lexical part. Pragmatics, on the other hand, deals 
with the use of the expressions in real life in a real context of occurrence; it has a more 
practical side. In an utterance like the one mentioned before (Could you close the 
window?) a semantic interpretation would be whether the other participant is capable of 
closing the window. If the hearer ignores the practical side, he would respond “yes/no”. 
Nonetheless, what the speaker is meaning is that he wants the other participant to close 
the window. The pragmatics in this utterance would be the act of closing the window by 
the hearer.  
The following concern will be to deal with semantic inferences, a message which 
is deduced or inferred due to the semantic part of language. According to some authors, 
such as Saeed (1997) or Lafi (2008), entailments are the most obvious cases of semantic 
inferences. An entailment is a logical consequence or logical implication compounded 
by an entailing sentence and an inferred sentence. An example of entailment is the 
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following: Shakespeare wrote Hamlet. Hamlet is a play written by Shakespeare. The 
entailing sentence is the first one (Shakespeare wrote Hamlet) and Hamlet is a play 
written by Shakespeare is the inferred sentence, which is not directly expressed.  
Entailments represent a truth-relation, as Lafi (2008) and Saeed (1997) argued. 
The truth of the entailing sentence guarantees the truth of the inferred sentence (if one is 
true the other one must be true as well), and, in the previous case, the falsity of the first 
also signifies the falsity of the second one. Anderson et al. (1971) characterised them as 
‘the heart of logic’, ‘natural deduction’ and ‘intuitionistic implication’. Going back to 
the previous example, the statement that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet (which is a true 
assertion) implies the truth of the sentence that Hamlet was written by Shakespeare. If 
the first sentence was false (supposing that Shakespeare did not write Hamlet), then 
Hamlet would not be a play by Shakespeare either (implying the falsity of the second 
statement).  
There are several cases in which entailments can occur. One of them (as in the 
case above) is active-passive syntactic constructions. In these constructions the syntactic 
order and the verb tense changes; however, the semantics is the same. Another example 
of active-passive entailment is Martin fixed the table that Charles had broken. The table 
that had been broken by Charles was fixed by Martin. As mentioned before, both 
sentences mean the same and one entails the other.  
Another case of entailments are paraphrase constructions (Saeed, 1997: 100), for 
they mutually entail one another. These, as the example above, are sentences that have 
the same meaning but a different construction; although a paraphrase construction 
conveys the same meaning than another one, they use different expressions or different 
words to code that meaning. An example is the following one: Brutus, Cassius and 
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Casca assassinated Caesar. Caesar died. (Lafi, 2008: 3). In this case, the inferred 
sentence semantically alludes to the fact that somebody died, which connects to the 
entailing sentence that somebody assassinated someone else. Another inferred 
conclusion would be that Brutus, Cassius and Casca killed somebody.  
In this case, the truth of the entailing sentence guarantees the truth of the inferred 
sentence and the falsity of the second means the falsity of the first one (if Caesar is alive 
the first statement could not be true, since they would not have assassinated him). Since 
kill and assassinate are synonyms and death is the result of both, this can be another 
mechanism of inference production.  
Finally, synonyms and hyponyms give cause to entailments as well (Lafi, 2008: 
3). A hyponym is “a word whose meaning is included in the meaning of another word” 
(Cambridge Dictionary). A case of hyponymy would be the following example 
regarding fruits. I ate two apples and cherries. I ate fruit. In this case, apples and 
cherries are hyponyms of the superordinate fruit. Consequently, the truth of the 
entailing sentence is equivalent to the truth of the inferred sentence, for apple and cherry 
are types of fruit. The falsity of the inferred sentence, in this case, would mean that the 
entailed sentence is also false (if somebody does not eat fruit, he/she cannot eat apples 
or cherries since they are types of fruits).  
 
4.2.Pragmatic Inferences  
Having dealt with instances of semantic inferences, we turn to pragmatic inferences, a 
group which is divided between presuppositions and implicatures. In this section these 
concepts are going to be explained and illustrated with the use of examples, and there is 
going to be also a summary of their most important features, also comparing them to 
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entailments. A pragmatic inference, as mentioned before, is attached to the form rather 
than to the meaning of what is said. An instance of pragmatic inference would be a 
conversational implicature, which is better exemplified in the following example: 
A: Somebody is knocking on the door  
B: I’m in the shower 
In this example, the context in which this conversation is located and the 
knowledge of the world of the participants play a very important role in the 
understanding of the message that speaker B utters. Both sentences are apparently 
unconnected semantically; however, they have a close pragmatic relation. By this 
statement, speaker A is trying to order speaker B to open the door. Nonetheless, speaker 
B’s real message is not that he is in the shower. He is trying to explain his inability to 
open the door, since that would convey going out of the shower. 
This is one clear example of pragmatic inference; however, there are many other 
examples that are going to be mentioned and explained during the rest of the project, 
outlining the difference between presuppositions and implicatures. Notwithstanding, as 
mentioned above, the line and boundaries between a pragmatic inference and a semantic 
inference is not clear, and it is going to be exemplified later on.  
 
4.2.1. Presuppositions  
First of all, an attempt will be made to deal with the meaning of presuppositions and the 
main features they share. The majority of linguists locate presuppositions within the 
group of pragmatic inferences, although there seems to be a twist in this debate, about 
the issue whether they should be regarded as pragmatic or semantic. Potts (2015) 
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affirms that “this is because (at least some) presuppositions might be emergent from the 
at-issue meaning and its interactions with general pragmatic pressures, but also 
conventionalized”. An explanation of this dichotomy will be discussed later on, 
supported with the use of examples; nevertheless, my point is to follow the assumption 
that they are pragmatic inferences, so as to distinguish them from the type of semantic 
inferences explained before: entailments.  
To understand this, it is necessary to explain what a presupposition is and also 
how it differs from the rest of inferences. As in the rest of the examples so far, 
inferences are messages that are not explicitly mentioned by the speaker yet deduced by 
the hearer. Presuppositions are implicit messages that the speaker deduces or assumes in 
order to give a meaning to the current sentence: 
Presuppositions are meanings that the speaker takes for granted and thus (acts as if she) 
assumes to be uncontroversial. Speakers might even go so far as to express certain pieces 
of information via presupposition triggers in order to signal what is and isn't up for debate. 
Thus, objecting to presuppositions can be difficult. (Potts, 2015: 3) 
That is to say, they are not explicit messages, as advanced before, and therefore 
they are not debatable or arguable, for they are implicated by the speaker and deduced 
by the hearer. As mentioned above, one can take from discourse much more than what 
is mentioned explicitly, because in these cases, speakers implicate something that 
hearers must infer or deduce. The function of presuppositions is the same. To 
presuppose something means to assume it (Saeed, 1997: 101).  For instance, in the 
statement “Juan is ill again” it is presupposed that he was ill before, as well as in the 
assertion “Juan needed 7 years to finish his studies” it is presupposed that Juan was a 
student and that he needed more time than the average to finish his studies (Renkema, 
2004: 196) “Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the common ground 
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of the participants in the conversation” (Stalnaker, 1978: 321). In other words, speakers 
utter something that is supposed to be background or already known information to all 
the speakers in a communicative exchange, as in the example below:  
A: My uncle is coming home from Canada.  
B: How long has he been away for?  
By answering the first statement with another question about it, B accepts the 
presupposition that A has an uncle (Brown and Yule, 1983: 29). Speaker B does not 
answer: Do you have an uncle?, but instead he asks how long has he been away for, 
accepting that A has an uncle that is coming home from Canada. At the same time, A 
presupposes that B already knows that he has an uncle, and, therefore, he does not have 
to specify it before saying that he is coming home from Canada. Thus, in this case, the 
speaker does not mention before that he has an uncle, and it seems that it is not needed 
in the conversation for speaker B to understand the fact that he is coming home from 
Canada. 
Now, the following concern will be to address the different features of 
presuppositions, comparing them to entailments and seeing how they differ or to what 
extent they are similar. One major contrast between presuppositions and entailments is 
that presuppositions depend on the context where they are located, which means that 
they remain unaffected when the sentence is negated. Entailments, on the other hand, 
disappear when the entailing expression is negated. This property is known as constancy 
under negation (Brown and Yule, 1983: 29-30). Let us focus on the previous example 
of a presupposition and then compare it to an entailment. 
A. My uncle is coming home from Canada.  
B. My uncle is not coming home from Canada.  
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In both sentences, the presupposition would be that the speaker has an uncle, the 
difference would be that in example A he is coming home from Canada and in the 
example B he is not. The result is that a sentence (A) and its negative counterpart (B) 
share the same set of presuppositions. There is a way in which the speaker can deny the 
presupposition of the speaker in an aggressive way, although this is not the case in 
normal situations. There could be the case of the following statement: My uncle is not 
coming from Canada because I do not have an uncle, (and, therefore, it is impossible 
that he is coming from Canada, since he does not exist) (Brown and Yule, 1983: 30).  
Saeed (1997) also proposed that if we negate a presupposition it survives. This is 
exemplified through the following example.  
 I saw my father today/ I saw someone today – I did not see my father today/ I saw 
someone today  
Constancy under negation can also be applied to more examples such as the next one: 
A: Juan is ill again. 
B: Juan is not ill again. 
In both sentences, the presupposition that is shared is that Juan was ill before. In 
case A, he is saying that he is ill again (almost for the second time), and in case B he is 
trying to convey that he was ill but that this time he is not. Since it is a presupposition, it 
remains constant under negation. In entailments, it does not work like that. To explain 
that, let us use the example of an entailment that was used before:  
A: Shakespeare is the author of Hamlet.  
B: Hamlet was written by Shakespeare (Lafi, 2008: 3)  
In this case, if we turn example B into a negative sentence (Hamlet was not 
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written by Shakespeare), example A has to be negative as well so as to have the same 
lexical meaning (Shakespeare is not the author of Hamlet). Consequently, entailments 
are a purely semantic relation for they represent a fixed- truth relation to the entailing 
expression (Lafi, 2008: 6). 
Another property shared by presuppositions is defeasibility, or the cancelling of 
presuppositions, which is also present in many other pragmatic inferences. Saeed (1997) 
argues that “presuppositional behavior seems sensitive to context”. In other words, a 
presupposition is defeasible if it disappears in some situation or context, and this is 
closely connected to the fact that presuppositions are located in the group of pragmatic 
inferences. To exemplify this property let us consider the following example.  
A: Martha cried before finishing her degree 
B: Martha died before finishing her degree 
From the first sentence (A) it is presupposed that Martha finished her degree, and 
that she cried before finishing it. From the second sentence (B) it is deduced that Martha 
did not finish her degree, for she died first. Both sentences have the same syntactic 
structure; nevertheless, they give rise to extremely opposed presuppositions, and this 
happens because our knowledge of the world says that a dead person cannot finish a 
degree, so that the presupposition is blocked.  
The following feature shared by presuppositions is detachability. This is related to 
the fact that presuppositions are attached to the form rather to the meaning of what is 
said. As will become clear later on, proper names, verbs of judgment, factive verbs and 
cleft sentences are presupposition-generating items. An inference is said to be 
detachable if it is possible to say the same thing in a different way (Lafi, 2008: 5). The 
next sentence is an instance that illustrates this principle well: The paramilitary forces 
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managed to rescue the victims of the flood. From that sentence, there are two other 
statements that can be deduced or presupposed: 
A: The paramilitary forces tried to rescue the victims of the flood  
B: The paramilitary forces rescued the victims of the flood. 
As a conclusion, since presuppositions are more centered on the form than on the 
meaning, they can survive in a wide range of linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts, 
such as modal verbs (for instance with “should” or “ought to”), compound sentences 
(linked with connectors such as “and”, “or” or “if”) and negation.  
Some authors, such as Potts (2015) and Horn and Ward (2004) argue that 
presuppositions can also have a semantic side; therefore, they distinguish between 
semantic and pragmatic presuppositions. “Pragmatic presuppositions are purely speaker 
actions, whereas semantic presuppositions deal with conventional aspects of the 
meanings of specific words and constructions” (Potts, 2015: 3) That is connected to the 
observation above that semantics is related to the lexical part of the word, to the 
meaning itself, and pragmatics to the speaker’s actions, which transcend the boundaries 
of the semantic meaning. In this case, these authors affirm that presuppositions, 
conceived as pragmatic inferences by the majority of linguists, can also have a semantic 
interpretation. This is because, as mentioned before, in some aspects presuppositions 
may seem like entailments: “a fairly automatic relationship, involving no reasoning, 
which seems free of contextual effects” (Potts, 2015: 4). In other respects, though, 
presupposition may be sensitive to the context or utterance, for they are examples of 
extra-semantic rules that are more related to the context (pragmatics) than to the 
meaning of the words itself. 
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Semantic presuppositions, also called conventional or lexical, are part of the 
encoded meanings of specific words or constructions, which receive the name of 
presupposition triggers (Potts, 2015: 4). Presupposition triggers are presupposition 
generating linguistic items. We focus on these now:  
Levinson (1983) distinguished several mechanisms that can create 
presuppositions. The first one is to use a referring expression that can be simple or 
compound. These expressions can be proper nouns, possessives, quantified noun 
phrases, etc. that give rise to ‘presuppositions of existence’. Let us consider examples A 
and B below, discussed by Levinson himself: 
A: Alexander is a staunch vegetarian  
B: Alexander’s car is the best of its class 
In example A (Alexander is a staunch vegetarian) the proper name Alexander 
causes a presupposition of existence that is Someone called Alexander exists or There is 
a person whose name is Alexander. However, in sentence B (Alexander’s car is the best 
of its class) the presupposed message is Alexander owns a car or Alexander owns a 
good car. In this example, what gives rise to the presupposition is the fact of possessing 
a car which is supposed to be the best of its class.  
Another group of presuppositions is created due to the use of lexical items that are 
called factive verbs (such as realise, know or regret) or verbs of judgment (as for 
example, blame). These verbs, according to Levinson (1983), introduce another clause, 
which is supposed to be true, and the presupposition arises from that clause. An attempt 
will be made to make it more understandable through the following examples.  
A: John regrets leaving the party so early yesterday evening 
B: Mary blamed John for being so rude to the policeman  
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In the first sentence (A), the presupposition that arises is the following one: John 
left the party early yesterday. From that presupposition it could also be inferred that he 
would have stayed later in the party. If someone rejects something it means that it is a 
true act in the past that could not be changed in the present. The second sentence (B) is 
similar to the first one. The presupposition created from this one is that John was rude to 
the policeman.  
Another type of presupposition trigger is switch presuppositions (Lafi, 2008: 3). 
These expressions are state verbs such as stop or start that indicate a new state or action 
or a change in that. “Such a verb describes a new state (or a kind of change in state), and 
simultaneously presupposes that the newly described state of affairs did not exist prior 
to the change” (Lafi, 2008: 3). In other words, the presupposition of these statements is 
that something new happened, something that has changed or something that is not 
going to happen anymore, as in the following instances:  
A: I started to go to Madrid in summer 
B: I stopped going to Madrid in summer 
From the first sentence it is deduced that this speaker did not use to go to Madrid 
in summer; however, at a given time, the speaker changed this habit and at the present 
time he goes to Madrid in summer. Example B is the other way round. Somebody used 
to go to Madrid in summer, and he or she decided not to come back.  
Cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions also create presuppositions. In some respects, 
they are also types of existential constructions that hold a different structure yet the 
same meaning. Examples of presuppositions regarding cleft and pseudo-cleft 
constructions are the following:  
A: It was his arrogance that irritated me  
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B: What irritated me was his arrogance 
From these two sentences, the same presupposition arises (something irritated 
me). Clefts are well-known for focussing the asserted part of the message on the post-
copular element (his arrogance in the examples above) while relegating the information 
in the relative-like clause to the status of presupposed. These constructions, therefore, 
are also presupposition triggers. 
Finally, and to conclude these examples of presupposition triggers recounted by 
Levinson (1983) it has to be said that subordinated clauses are also mechanisms for 
generating presuppositions. There are many types of subordinate clauses. Time and 
place adverbial clauses and comparative clauses as the following examples are the ones 
that are going to be subject of my analysis.  
A: I received the package before I went to Barcelona (in this case, the 
presupposition is that he or she went to Barcelona). In this example, the presupposition 
arises from a time adverbial subordinate clause.  
B: My sister broke her leg where I broke mine (in this case, the presupposition 
that is generated is that he/she broke a leg). Here, the presupposition is caused by a 
place adverbial subordinate clause.  
C: He is more generous than you are (the presupposition that arises from this 
sentence is that this person is generous). In this case, the construction is a comparative 
one.  
Having dealt with this kind of pragmatic presuppositions, it is worth mentioning 
that even semantic presuppositions can be pragmatic, inasmuch as they must be 
evaluated in the discourse participants’ shared knowledge or common ground; most 
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presuppositions hold only in specific co-texts, so it is necessary to know the background 
information to evaluate them, as in the examples above (Potts, 2015: 4). 
However, Stalnaker (1978), Brown and Yule (1983), Lafi (2008) et al., among 
others, approached the visualization of presuppositions in a different way than Potts, 
and they concluded in that all presuppositions should be understood in pragmatic terms; 
as a result, they were included in this project in the group of pragmatic inferences.  
 
4.2.2. Implicatures  
The last concept that we need to deal with is the notion of implicature. It deviates from 
entailments and presuppositions in many ways; however, the three of them are used to 
convey something which is not directly said. First of all, it is important to say that 
implicature is another instance of pragmatic inference, as well as presuppositions. As it 
is going to be explained later on, presuppositions and implicatures share some of their 
properties; however, they are considered different notions since they also differ in some 
respects. Whereas presuppositions are inferences regarding background assumptions, 
implicatures stand for what is implicated rather than assumed (Lafi, 2008: 9) 
To begin with, the term implicature is related to what a hearer can infer or suggest 
from what the speaker says implicitly (Brown and Yule, 1983: 31) Implicatures, thus, 
are also pragmatic aspects of meaning and they can be emanated from the literal 
meaning of an utterance in a given context shared by speaker and hearer. The notion of 
implicature was first introduced by Grice (1975) to convey that in a conversational 
interaction the person who speaks usually means more than what it is said. An 
implicature arises, according to Haugh (2002) when the following process occurs:  
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1. One speaker (A) says a particular utterance (X) 
2. This speaker (A) believes that by saying this utterance, the addressee or hearer 
(B) can think something else (Y) that is not explicitly mentioned in the message 
(X) 
3. The hearer (B) thinks something else in addition to message that the speaker 
utters (and this ‘something else’ is the implicature itself) 
Leaving this theoretical explanation aside, the functioning of implicatures may be 
illustrated with the support of the following example. 
A: Can you lend me 5 dollars? 
B: My purse is in the hall.  
In this communicative exchange, by saying that his purse is in the hall, speaker B 
is answering positively to the question that A asked. The speaker believes that by saying 
that, the hearer would interpret the extra meaning that he can lend him some money. 
Therefore, the implicature of this conversation is: yes. That is, the hearer creates a 
different yet true representation of the linguistic proposition according to his own 
knowledge and what he understood by the speaker’s answer, and this occurs because 
speakers mean more than what they actually say.  
As Grice (1975) argues, what is said is the meaning of an utterance “after 
semantic decoding, reference resolution, indexical fixing and disambiguation” 
Therefore, he used the word say when what somebody says holds a close relation to the 
conventional meaning of the words uttered. In order to deal with a more in depth 
analysis of implicatures, it is crucial to mention the role of the conversational maxims 
and of the different types of implicature that exist, since many differences exist between 
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the two main types of implicatures: conversational implicatures and conventional 
implicatutres.  
 
4.2.2.1.The Cooperative Principle and The Conversational Maxims  
To understand Paul Grice’s Theory of Conversational Maxims, it is highly 
important to explain the so called Cooperative Principle, since the basis of Pragmatics is 
centred on that. The Cooperative Principle lies on the assumption that the speaker 
should “make a conversational contribution such as is it required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which somebody is 
engaged” (Imanuddin, 2008: 2). In other words, members of a communicative exchange 
should adapt themselves to the compliance of a set of rules called the Conversational 
Maxims in order to maintain a successful conversation. Grice proposed this principle 
because it is believed that all members in a conversation should use language in a 
simple way and with the maximum degree of effectiveness to communicate with each 
other.  Human beings have an unerring tendency to be cooperative in conversations; 
only machines (as in artificial intelligence, for instance) would find the two formally 
unconnected sentences of examples A and B above to be pragmatically unconnected. 
The Cooperative Principle is notoriously absent in legal discourse, for instance, which 
goes to explain why the language of the law is virtually opaque to normal language 
users and why it requires armies of specialist interpreters to decipher it: lawyers (Pinker, 
1984: 222 ff.)  
This principle is quite easier to understand if it is explained through the following 
example: 
A: I’m running out of petrol. 
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B: There is a garage around the corner.  
In this case, if B is obeying the Cooperative Principle, the garage should be open 
and full of petrol. This conversation would be successful if speaker A understands the 
same that B is trying to convey with his message. This contribution is called 
conversational implicature. This principle states the following:   
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage which it occurs, by 
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice, 
1975: 45) 
The Cooperative Principle, therefore, is believed to be followed by all members in 
a communicative exchange so as to implement effective communication. This principle 
is based, as said before, on the application and compliance of a set of norms which are 
called the Conversational Maxims, a kind of ‘tacit agreement’ by speakers and listeners 
to cooperate in communication (Grice, 1975). These maxims are organized as follows:  
- Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purposes of the exchange). Do not make your contribution more 
informative than is required. 
- Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which 
you lack adequate evidence. 
- Relation: Be relevant. 
- Manner: Be perspicuous, avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be 
brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) and be orderly (Brown and Yule, 1983: 
32) 
As Grice (1975) and Levinson (2000) suggest, the maxims of the Cooperative 
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Principle are not arbitrary, ‘but rather describe rational means for conducting co-
operative exchanges’. That is, implicatures are created because of the assumptions that 
hearers in a communicative exchange take from the speaker’s attitude. The conversa-
tional maxims may help participants in a communicative exchange derive implicatures 
(Renkema, 2004: 19). These can be classified into three main groups or categories ac-
cording to the speaker’s attitude towards the maxims (Grice, 1975): 
The first group comprises implicatures that arise from the observance of the con-
versational maxims; they are therefore, examples in which no maxim is violated. An 
example of this category would be the garage example.  
A: I am out of petrol  
B: There is a garage round the corner 
In the previous example, speaker B is not violating any of the maxims, since he is 
being as informative as required according to this communicative exchange. When 
speaker B says that there is a garage round the corner, the implicature that A has to de-
duce is that the garage is open and that petrol is sold there. The maxim would not be 
successful if the garage was closed, for instance; and, therefore, the message conveyed 
would not be the same.  
The second category is composed by implicatures arising from the violation of 
one or more than one maxim. An example of this group is the following one:  
A: Where does Martin live? 
B: Somewhere in the south of France 
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By answering that, B is violating the maxims of relation and manner, since he is 
not being relevant enough. The implicature arising is that B does not know exactly 
where Martin lives, and, therefore, he answers something quite ambiguous, since he can 
live either in Toulouse or in Montpellier, for instance, which are cities that are not close 
to each other.  
Indeed, sometimes we may choose to distance ourselves still further from communicative 
norms and deliberately violate the maxims: liars, tricksters, ironists and cheats thrive in the 
ambience of the socially expected. (Bennoti and Blackburn, 2014: 6) 
This last group consists of implicatures arising from the flouting or exploitation of 
a maxim. Sometimes, the speaker flouts the maxims of the Cooperative Principle on 
purpose in order to make the hearer be aware of that (Paltridge, 2012: 64). This usually 
happens in cases of irony or metaphors, when what the speaker says is not what he 
actually thinks. Therefore, a maxim is violated only at the level of ‘what is said’.  In this 
case, Grice (1975) proposed one example of sarcasm to explain the purpose of this kind 
of implicatures.  Speaker A and speaker B are in the street, and then, another person (C) 
passes by and speaker A comments “look, there’s your friend”. Speaker B obviously 
knows that it is an ironic statement, since C is not their friend, and, what is more, they 
are not friends at all, and, therefore, this message is interpreted as a joke. In this case, A 
violated purposely the maxims and, by doing that, he intended B to be aware of that. 
This is a mechanism of irony or sarcasm that A uses; so that, B infers thanks to his 
knowledge of the world that A is referring to a person they do not get on well with, 
although this is not directly said by A. Another example of this type is a flouting of the 
maxim of quality in the following conversation:  
A: Tehran’s in Turkey, isn’t it, teacher? 
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B: And London’s in Armenia, I suppose 
From this exchange, the student must deduce that Teheran is not in Turkey for 
London is not in Armenia either. By saying that, the speaker is trying to make the hearer 
understand that his message is ironic. Therefore, the speaker is blatantly failing to fulfill 
the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975: 48). 
 
4.2.2.2.Conversational Implicature  
The implicatures that belong to this first group are clearly pragmatic notions. A conver-
sational implicature is the extra-meaning that is connected to the sense of the utterance 
(Lafi, 2008:9). That is to say, it is a further message that can be deduced from a sen-
tence. As noted above, it is related to what the speaker implicates (which is opposed to 
what he actually says).    
Conversational implicatures, according to Grice (1975) and Brown and Yule 
(1983) arise from the Cooperative Principle and the Conversational Maxims, as 
mentioned before, either because of the compliance with these norms or because of the 
disobedience of these rules. They derive from the presumption that two participants in a 
conversation are interacting according to the cooperative principle to reach “a common 
goal” (Horn and Ward, 2004: 6)  
They are “highly contextualized inferences” (Bennoti and Blackburn, 2004: 3), 
because they are context dependent, they are not tied to any lexical word specifically, 
but either to the context itself, and that is why they are allocated in the pragmatic group 
of inferences, for they are non-lexical.  If we focus on the following example, we will 
see that the implicature created does not arise from any particular word of the message, 
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but either from the context itself.  
A: Would you like to come to the cinema tonight? 
B: I have to prepare a project for tomorrow 
From this exchange, speaker A should infer from B’s message that he is going to 
be busy and, therefore, he cannot go with him to the cinema. This implicature is not 
originated because of the lexical meaning of any particular word of B’s answer, but 
rather from the message itself in general, and also because of the knowledge of the 
world and commonsense that speaker A has. That is, it is “not literally said by the 
speaker but it is inferred by the hearer from what the speaker has said and their manner 
of saying it in a particular context” (Haugh, 2002: 128) The message “I cannot go 
tonight” is not literally said by speaker B; however, A interprets the message with this 
extra-meaning, since what B means is much more communicative than what he actually 
says. No human is expected to have problems with the derivation of these missing links 
or information, but certainly, this ability that comes up so cheap to us proves to be an 
insurmountable mountain for computers, which are unable of understanding such 
implied language.  
All conversational implicatures share some common features that make them 
belong to the same group of inferences. As Haugh (2002) et al. argue, conversational 
implicatures are defeasible, which means that they could be negated or denied later on 
in the conversation. To exemplify that, the previous example of the invitation to the 
cinema will be used. Speaker A asks speaker B to go to the cinema, and speaker B 
answers that he has to prepare a project for the following day, implying that he would 
not go to the cinema. Nevertheless, if speaker B adds later on I have to prepare a 
project for tomorrow, but I will finish early, he is somehow cancelling the previous 
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implicature that he cannot go to the cinema.  
Another example of this property would be the example of the purse used before. 
Speaker A asks speaker B if he would lend him some money and speaker B answers: 
‘my purse is in the hall’ implying that he can take some money. This implicature can 
also be denied if speaker B added My purse is in the hall but I do not have money, and 
this is deniable without contradiction, since what he says now is not opposed to what he 
had said before.  
The second property is presented by Lafi (2008) as non-detachability. 
Implicatures, unlike presuppositions, are not tied to a particular lexical item, but rather 
to the semantic content of the utterance in general, they cannot be detached by changing 
the words of the utterance. Therefore, the words of the conversational implicature can 
be changed by synonyms and the conversational implicature would still have meaning. 
In the garage example, the word garage can be replaced by petrol station or service 
station and the conversational implicature would still have the same meaning.  
Another property shared by conversational implicatures is calculability. 
According to Bennoti and Blackburn (2014), an implicature is said to be calculable 
when the listener is able to deduce and infer the implicature from the speaker’s 
utterance. That is to say, if speaker A says The phone is ringing and speaker B answers I 
am in the shower, speaker A has to deduce from this statement that speaker B cannot 
take the phone since he is in the shower, which would be an extra meaning attached to 
the message that he is in the shower. It is said to be calculable because the listener is 
able to deduce the message that the speaker utters.  
The following characteristic shared by conversational implicatures is non- 
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conventionality. As it is going to be explained later on, implicatures can also be 
conventional; however, conversational implicatures are not conventional, they are not 
part of the conventional meaning of the utterance that generates them (Lafi, 2008: 14). 
According to Potts (2015: 22), an implicature is conventional just in case “it is the result 
of the arbitrariness of the signs (lexical items, constructions)”. This is closely tied to the 
previous feature, since in order to understand a conversational implicature, pragmatics 
must be taken into account. An example of this property would be the following 
example:  
A: Where is John? 
B: There’s a yellow car in front of Susan’s house 
Speaker B is trying to convey here that John is the owner if the yellow car that is 
in front of Susan’s house. Speaker A has to deduce that message, which is not 
conventional, but whose interpretation is based on the context and on the shared 
knowledge of the participants in the conversation.  
Finally, conversational implicatures have potential indeterminacy and multiplicity 
of meanings. It is explained by Hirschberg (1985: 24) as follows: “A conversational 
implicatum is often a disjunction of several possible interpretations of an utterance and 
is often indeterminate”. Lafi (2008) explains this feature with the following example: 
Hani is a machine. This example can have several and many different meanings, for 
example, that she is efficient or that she never stops working; however, it can also mean 
that she lacks of emotional touch. This is basically what many authors mean by 
indeterminacy.  
All in all, conversational implicatures are not so close to the lexical system (as 
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opposed to other types of inferences), but they are “a type of behaviour exemplified by 
agents with intentions and goals” (Benotti and Blackburn, 2014: 4). That is to say, as 
explained before, they are dependent on the context and the knowledge of the 
participants in the conversation.  
 
4.2.2.3.Conventional Implicature  
Conventional implicatures are another type of inference that must be taken into account 
when the topic of implicit language is arisen. Grice (1975) distinguished these 
implicatures because the message is implied due to “the conventional meaning of the 
words used”. Therefore, this group of implicatures does not belong to the pragmatic 
part, but it is closer to semantics.  
One instance of this group would be the following one: He is an Englishman, he 
is, therefore, brave. In this example, the implicature is that because of the fact that he is 
an Englishman, he is brave, and that all Englishmen should be brave. The implicature is, 
thus, tied to the conventional meaning of the word ‘therefore’, since it is what joins both 
utterances together (he is an Englishman- he is brave). This group of implicatures have 
more in common with entailments and presuppositions than what they share with 
conversational implicatures, since they are created because of the lexical meaning of the 
words in an utterance; in the previous case, the connector ‘therefore’. Sometimes, 
according to Grice (1975), the conventional meaning of these words can help to 
determine what is implicated, as in the case before. Because of that, this information is 
not implicated, but understood from the conventional meaning of the word itself 
(Frapolli and Villanueva, 2007: 130) 
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Conventional implicatures, unlike conversational implicatures, cannot be can-
celled (Frapolli and Villanueva, 2007: 128). This is because conventional implicatures 
are attached to the meaning of the words of the utterance. If we take the previous exam-
ple, the implicature is that because of the fact that he is an Englishman he is brave. In 
conventional implicatures, this cannot be denied afterwards, since it is actually con-
firmed in the meaning of the words itself.  
There are some other expressions that cause conventional implicatures, such as 
‘too, also, even’, for instance. An example would be the following one: Even Ken knows 
that. In this example, what is conventionally implicated because of the term ‘even’ is 
that Ken is the least likely to know that.  It is conventionally implicated because the 
implicature arises from the meaning of one specific word in the utterance and not from 













The present study seeks to gather a sample of some of instances of implied language 
used in real conversations and dialogues by the characters of the American TV series 
Atypical. This series is about a year in the life of a teenager whose name is Sam 
Gardner. Sam studies his last year of High School and he also works in Techtropolis, an 
appliance store. As a teenager, he wishes to discover all the changes of this period, and 
he wants to be more independent from his parents and also to know more about girls, 
something that quite motivates him. Nevertheless, his mother is overprotective and 
believes that due to his autism he cannot carry out a normal life. Therefore, she always 
forces Casey, Sam’s little sister, to be in charge of him. Things start to change when 
Sam’s parents get divorced, her sister moves to another school since she obtains an 
athletic scholarship and he meets a girl. These events make him feel more self-confident 
and he also starts to be independent.  
From the two seasons analysed, there were almost one hundred of instances of 
implied language (c.f. Appendix); therefore, a selection was made of the most 
representative examples of each kind just to illustrate the concepts explained in the 
previous sections. First of all, the total number will be shown in a table and percentages 
of the use of these mechanisms will be calculated, both in isolated sentences and as part 
of a conversation. Then, such samples are going to be explained and classified 
according to the prior arrangement, following the categories of entailment, 







To begin with, it is worth mentioning the fact that there are, as it can be seen in the last 
part (c.f. Appendix), a great number of instances of implicit messages in real life 
conversations. First of all, it has to be said that the most prominent inference making 
mechanism is presupposition, since most of what the speaker does not say directly in a 
conversation is presupposed by the hearer. Let us see the results in a more visual way, 
using two illustrative tables, just to compare in a schematic way the frequency of use of 









Number 3 31 25 3 62 
 
Isolated sentences (1 
participant) 
Part of a conversation (between two 
or more participants) 
Total 
22 40 62 
 
From this table, we get to know that the majority of instances belong to the groups 
of presuppositions and conversational implicatures, 31 and 25 examples, respectively. It 
corresponds with the 50% in presuppositions and the 40,32% in conversational 
implicatures. On the other hand, both entailments and conventional implicatures trigger 
the least number of examples, both a 4,83% of the total. This results show that the 
majority cases belong to pragmatic inferences, which means that our propositions are 
affected by the context, and that implied messages do not depend on one lexical word in 
the sentence, buy on the context itself. Moreover, the majority of examples (c.f. 
Appendix) belong to a conversation (64,51%), which means that implicit language tends 
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to occur  in multiparty conversations, whereas the minority of cases occur in isolated 
sentences only produced by one speaker (35,48%). In the following sections, some of 
these examples are going to be classified and explained, following the theoretical part.   
 
5.2. Entailments 
To begin with, an attempt will be made to provide one real example of the concept of 
entailment. Entailments, as explained above, are logical consequences or natural 
deductions that arise from a message, and that belong to the group of semantic 
inferences. From this type there were fewer examples than from the rest, probably due 
to the fact that conversations between two or more participants are more focused on the 
pragmatic side, which was the main focus of this research. The unique example 
analysed is the following one:  
Sam, it’s the first night I’ve ever been apart from you.1 
As in every entailment, there is an entailing sentence, such as the prior one, and 
the inferred sentence, which is the following one: We have been always sleeping 
together until today. According to the types of entailments explained before, this is a 
case of paraphrase construction, since both sentences have the same meaning yet 
different construction, due to the use of different words and expressions.   
Following the main features of entailments we can see that the truth of the 
entailing sentence guarantees the truth of the entailed sentence. In the same way, the 
falsity of one (It’s not the first night I’ve been apart from you) would imply the falsity 
                                                             




of the other one (since that would mean that they would not have been sleeping together 
always).  
5.3. Presuppositions 
Presuppositions, as already explained, are different types of inferences; they belong to 
the pragmatic type. This is the most prominent and usual inference creating mechanism, 
since the great majority of examples of implied language found in this project belong to 
this type. Presuppositions are meanings that the speaker takes for granted from a 
specific context, which are created, as mentioned above, due to many different 
constructions. An attempt will be made in order to divide the most important examples 
of presuppositions found into different sub-types.  
First of all, let us focus on switch presuppositions, compounded, as mentioned 
above, by state verbs such as stop or start that indicate a new state or action or a change 
in that. An explanation of the following example would clarify this concept:  
 We never should have stopped inviting you on those trips2 
From this example, a presupposition arises (They have stopped inviting them and 
they are repentant now). It is deduced that somebody used to invite other people to their 
trips, and, due to any reason, they stopped doing it, and, at the present time, they do not 
go together. Presuppositions are more centred on the form than on the meaning; 
therefore, they can survive a wide range of linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts, such 
as modal verbs (in the example it appears should) and negation (also present in the 
example).  
                                                             




The next example that is going to be analysed belongs to the subordinate 
constructions, more specifically comparative constructions, which are also mechanisms 
for generating presuppositions:  
 I need her more than you do3 
In this case, as mentioned in the theoretical part above, presuppositions can also 
appear in subordinate constructions, in this case, comparative constructions. This is a 
clear case in point, since the sentence is a comparative of superiority (more than), which 
triggers the following implicit message (you don’t need her) due to the use of this 
expression and the context. What we take from this instance is that subordinate 
constructions are also presupposition generating items. From this group of subordinates, 
there are also more instances of different constructions, such as the following one: an 
adverbial clause. Let us consider that with the following example.  
The next instance of presupposition also belongs to the group of subordinate 
constructions; however, in this case, it belongs to the group of place adverbial 
subordinate clauses. As in the example proposed in the theoretical part (My sister broke 
her leg where I broke mine), the next example also triggers another meaning related to a 
place where two things occurred, although only one is mentioned explicitly.  
She was born in New Jersey, in the same town as Queen Latifah4 
In this example there are two messages. The first one is that the person who is 
speaking is talking about a girl who was born in New Jersey (something which is 
mentioned explicitly by the statement She was born in New Jersey).  Nevertheless, there 
                                                             






is also another message which is deduced by the hearer yet not directly expressed by the 
speaker (Queen Latifah was born in New Jersey). This presupposition survives to a 
wide range of contexts, such as negation, for instance. If we turn the sentence into a 
negative one (She was not born in New Jersey, unlike Queen Latifah) the presupposition 
that arises (Queen Latifah was born in New Jersey) does not differ from the previous 
one. This presupposition is also defeasible, since it disappears in some contexts, for 
example in the following examples:  
She was born in New Jersey, in the same town as Queen Latifah 
She died in New Jersey, in the same town as Queen Latifah 
Both sentences have the same syntactic structure; nevertheless, they give rise to 
extremely opposed presuppositions. In the first example, the presupposition that arises 
is that Queen Latifah was born in New Jersey, as mentioned before. In the second case, 
there are two presuppositions that arise. The first one is that Queen Latifah died in New 
Jersey, and the second one, quite obvious thanks to our knowledge of the world, is that 
Queen Latifah is not alive. 
Finally, the last case of presuppositions that is going to be analysed is the next 
one, belonging to a mixture between a referring expression and a comparison.  
My dad built an igloo. Way better than his last one5 
In this example, it is said explicitly that the father of the person who is speaking 
built an igloo (this is the explicit part of the message). There is also a part which is not 
directly expressed yet deduced because of the sentence way better than his last one. The 
message that arises is that he built one before and that this last one was not good 
enough. This is a clear example of presupposition since it also survives negation, since 





the presupposition does not arise from a specific word but from the meaning of the 
sentence in general. If we turn the sentence into a negative (My dad built an igloo. It is 
not better than his last one), the presupposition that arises does not change, since it is as 
well deduced that he built another one before.  
 
5.4.Conversational implicatures 
This group belongs to a highly contextualized case of inferences, in which the implicit 
message does not arise from the semantics of the clause but from the context in which 
the statement is placed. All the examples found belong to the group of implicatures 
generated from the observance of the maxims- in which no maim is violated-, since 
there are no cases of irony or sarcasm that led to a flout or violation of the Cooperative 
Principle. Let us see some examples taken from real conversations so as to analyse how 
they work in a more realistic fashion.   
A: Would you like to go on a date with me? 
B: Tonight I’m busy, but that’s so nice6 
From this communicative exchange, speaker A should infer from B’s message 
that he is going to be busy and, therefore, he cannot go on a date with him. This 
implicature, as said before,  is not detached to the lexical meaning of any particular 
word of B’s answer, but rather to the message in general and the knowledge of the 
world and commonsense that speaker A has (this is related to the feature of non-
detachability). Due to the fact of being busy, it is expected that she will not have time to 
meet A. Nevertheless, one of the features of the conversational implicatures is that they 
are cancellable; that is to say, they can be negated after pronouncing them and they still 




survive. Let us see it in this example above. From B’s answer it is understood that she 
cannot go on a date; however, it can be cancelled (Tonight I’m busy, but when I finish 
what I have to do I can meet you). 
Another example quite similar to the one below, in which there is also a 
proposition asked by speaker A, and speaker B’s answer conveys an implicature.  
A: Hi. So, I saw that we had a biology test coming up and, I don’t know, I was just thinking that 
maybe we could study together 
B: Why would I want to do that? I’m getting an “A” in Biology and you’re getting an “A” minus. 
That would not benefit me at all7 
In this case, the implicature that arises from B’s answer is that he does not want to 
study with speaker A, since it is directly said that studying with her would not benefit 
him at all. As in the previous example, this implicature is not retrieved from any 
particular word or expression but from the context in general. It can be negated as well, 
if speaker B says that despite the fact of getting better marks than A, he would like to 
study with her: (e.g. I’m getting an “A” in Biology and you’re getting an “A” minus. 
That would not benefit me at all. However, I would like to study with you because you 
seem a nice person and I would like to help you). In this case, the implicature that arose 
before is cancelled. The next example of implicature found is the following one:  
A: Want another drink? 
B: I think I’ve escaped my real life long enough8 
From this example, it can be seen an explicature (I think I’ve escaped my real life 
long enough) and also an implicature (Drinking makes me to escape my real life. I do 
not want another drink). This implicature, as well as the rest of the implicatures 





analysed, is understood thanks to the knowledge of the world of speaker A, who 
understands that B does not want another drink because she did not want to escape from 
her real life either. However, it can also be cancelled since speaker B may want to 
escape from her real life by drinking (I think I’ve escaped my real life long enough but I 
don’t mind, I want another drink). Here, the implicature that arises is just the opposite 
(speaker B wants another drink to escape from her real life).  
The last implicature analysed is the following one:  
A: Did you vacuum the rug? 
B: I woke up early9 
In this case, from B’s message we can retrieve an explicature (the fact that she 
woke up early), which is explicitly mentioned in the text, and an implicature (Yes, I did 
vacuum the rug), which is an implicit message connected to the fact of waking up early, 
since one message triggered the other one. As in the rest of the cases, this implicature is 
not tied to the lexical meaning of any particular word in the sentence, but to the context 
and the shared knowledge of the participants. Nevertheless, this implicature can also be 
cancelled (I woke up early but I did not vacuum the rug), eliminating the previous 
implicature caused by the original statement.  
 
5.5. Conventional implicatures 
Finally, conventional implicatures, belonging to the semantic type, as well as 
entailments, also appear many instances in the dialogues analysed. These instances are 
easily identifiable, since they arise from the lexical meaning of the words in an 
utterance. Three different examples will be provided and analysed:  




My cousin works at a car wash, therefore he knows all about girls.10 
From this message, quite similar to one provided above in the theoretical part, it 
can be retrieved an inference via deductive principles: people who work at a car wash 
know everything about girls. The connective therefore provides a link between two 
utterances: my cousin works at a car wash/ he knows all about girls. These sentences are 
apparently unrelated messages; however, the placement of this word, which is a linking 
that denotes consequence, leads to a relation between the fact of working at a car wash 
and knowing all about girls. Once this message is uttered, people who are hearing the 
message could wonder what the connection between these facts is. It could be either due 
to the fact that he works with many girls, so that he knows them quite good or because 
he works with people that understand about girl’s issues. Whatever the case, the lexical 
meaning of the word therefore is what triggers the inference in this case in particular. It 
is distinguished from a presupposition because this cannot be denied afterwards, since it 
is confirmed in the meaning of the words itself. If we said “my cousin works at a car 
wash, therefore he does not know anything about girls”, the implicature would change, 
since working at a car wash would not be related to knowing all about girls, but the 
opposite.  
The second example analysed is the next one, also triggered by a connective ad-
junct.  
I’m black, so they put me on the brochures11 
In this instance, as well as in the example above, two apparently unrelated sen-
tences (I’m black- they put me on the brochures) are linked with a connective so, creat-
ing a conventional implicature, an additional message (Black people tend to appear on 





brochures). In this case, like in the previous one, the lexical meaning of the item so is 
what triggers the conventional implicature, and not the context itself- and this is why 
this is a semantic inference. It belongs to this group because it does not survive under 
negation. If we turn this positive sentence into a negative one, it does not have the same 
implicature (I’m not black so they put me in brochures or I’m black, so they do not put 
me on brochures). From these two messages, the implicature that would arise is just the 
opposite than in the previous case (the relation between being black and appear on bro-
chures would not exist in these examples, or, in other words, it would exist but it would 
be a contrary relation than in the previous one).  
The final example of conventional implicatures that is going to be subject of my 
analysis is the following one: 
Even Sharice turned against me.12 
This sentence also conveys an additional message attached to the word ‘even’, 
which is that Sharice is the last person she believes she would turn against her, and that 
even though, she did it. This is allocated into the group of conventional implicatures 
since the inference created is not dependent on the context in general, but of the specific 
meaning of a word, in this case, even. This term is usually employed to emphasize 
something that is quite surprising; in this case, the fact that Sharice turned against her, 
which is surprising because they were supposed to be close friends. As explained in the 
previous example as well, it cannot be denied, for the meaning of the implicature would 
change from the original one. In this case, if we turn the sentence into negative (“Even 
Sharice did not turn against me”) the implicature was that she did not turned against her 
and, therefore, this sentence would not carry the same lexical meaning to the other one.  




6. CONCLUSIONS  
Throughout the present paper, an explanation and use of implied messages in real life 
conversations have been shown and exemplified in genuine dialogues between 
characters from a TV series. An attempt was made to distinguish, first of all, different 
yet closely related instances of inferences and illustrate them with the use of examples. 
To establish a connection between Discourse Analysis and Pragmatics was also a 
concern of the project, and they proved to be -as announced in the introductiont- two 
disciplines that go hand in hand, since both analyse language beyond the sentence level 
and the inseparability of the form and the purpose of communication. It has been 
acknowledged that sometimes messages are “conveyed by implication and retrieved by 
inferencing” (Saddock, 1978: 283). This quote, I think, summarises in a quite well-
aimed way the purpose of this project, since it goes back to the prior dichotomy used 
from beginning to end of  this project, that stated that “speakers implicate, hearers 
infer”.  
I focus now on a few of the most relevant results of my investigation. First of all, 
it was found that the thesis exposed from the beginning, that speakers mean more than 
they say, is a reality, since we use, both consciously and unconsciously, several 
inference creating mechanisms to communicate. From these mechanisms, a distinction 
should be made among them, as it was previously explained in the rest of the sections. 
First of all, entailments should be distinguished from the rest, since they trigger a literal 
meaning of the sentence, and they are the most visible semantic inference. Secondly, 
presuppositions are related to the meanings that the speaker takes for granted, since they 
are background assumptions or shared knowledge among participants, and thus code 
information that is assumed to be uncontroversial (Potts, 2015: 3). Finally, implicatures 
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convey an additional message which is not literally said but which is pertinent in order 
to understand a message. Therefore, a proposition expressed by an utterance can be 
entailed, presupposed or conversationally or conventionally implicated, since these are 
the inference generating mechanisms studied. All in all, we must acknowledge the fact 
that this behaviour is difficult to replicate in mechanisms of artificial intelligence and 
that we must to take into account global aspects of our cognitive system (such as the 
inferential capacity or the analysis of the hearer’s brain in order to adapt our message) 
when we, as human beings, want to decipher certain messages. 
Once a distinction among the major types has been established, it is essential to 
account for their use in real life, since, as explained above, some groups have a higher 
frequency of appearance than the rest. Let us summarise the main results. From the in-
stances analysed, we can go as far as to say that there were a higher number of instances 
of presuppositions and conversational implicatures, which are the most pervasive mech-
anisms (both with more than a 40% of the total of examples). The presence of these 
processes arises from the fact that the majority of examples analysed come from dia-
logues between two or more participants, in which these mechanisms abound more. 
This could also be related to the fact that clearly pragmatic inferences, also named 
“highly contextualised inferences” by Bennoti and Blackburn (2004: 3), such as impli-
catures, are much more centred on the context itself than on the meaning of a particular 
term. On the other hand, clearly semantic inferences, such as entailments or convention-
al implicatures, are not so frequent in real life conversations, at least in the instances 
analysed, for they both show only less than a 5% from the total of implied messages.  
To conclude, there were some limitations in this study, such as the following. First 
of all, as announced from the beginning, the boundaries between a semantic inference 
and a pragmatic one are not clearly demarcated. Some authors, as mentioned above, 
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include some of them in one group or another (as in the case of presuppositions and 
conventional implicatures). Therefore, it proved to be difficult to make a clear-cut dis-
tinction between these two groups, since interpretations vary among linguists. Secondly, 
it would be much more interesting to elaborate an accurate quantitative study of the fre-
quency of appearance of implicatures in a real life conversation (via the use of a larger 
corpus), also with the use of more illustrative tables, such as the ones used above. This 
process, nevertheless, would have required a lot of time and space for the dissertation. 
Furthermore, it would also be interesting to explain why implicatures occur (from the 
types explained above, such as the observance of the maxims or the flouting of the max-
ims) and focus on the use of hedges and flouting or violating the maxims in cases of 
irony and sarcasm, for instance. The use of sarcasm and irony would be, as a conse-
quence, a suggestion for possible further research in this field, since both processes are 
also instances of implied message, in which what the speaker says is frequently the op-
posite of what he/she is actually thinking. This study would contribute to a more ex-
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Appendix: Atypical (selected dialogues)  
Retrieved from: RASHID, R. (2017): Atypical. Sony Pictures Television, Netflix, 
United States.  
A: Should we take another picture with Edison? I read online that girls love animals. 
Maybe like this 
B: I think this might go quicker if you just leave.  
Implied Messages (I.M. henceforth): 1. Edison is an animal. 2. We should not take 
another picture with him. 
A: So, how’s your week?  
B: Well, I still don’t have a date, and I scared a girl off from across the room, and we 
had meat loaf twice, and I hate meat loaf. 
I.M.: 1. My week is not going very well. 
A: When you make eye contact, you have to look away a bit 
B: But how can I make eye contact and look away? I mean, I’m not a mantis shrimp 
I. M.: 1. Mantis can do that, they can look to two different places at a time. 
A: I’ll take her to techtropolis 
B: Take a girl to an appliance store?  
A: I have to go where I’m comfortable 
I.M: 1. Techtropolis is an appliance store. 2. I’m comfortable in Techtropolis.  
A: I feel like I’m in college again 
I.M: 1. I have already been in college before that. 
A: Want another drink? 
B: I think I’ve escaped my real life long enough 
I.M: 1. Drinking makes me to escape my real life. 2. I do not want another drink. 
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A: You’re funny. A kind of mean 
B: Yeah, I’m always mean to people I like 
I.M: 1. I like you. 
A: Penguins met for life so penguins aren’t like people 
I.M: 1. People do not met for life. 
A: Sometimes I wish I was smooth, like Zahid 
I.M: 1. Zahid is smooth 
A: You’re wearing a sweatshirt? 
B: What’s wrong with it? 
A: Nothing, I just don’t understand why you do all that working out if you’re not gonna 
flaunt your cute figure 
I.M: 1. This sweatshirt does not fit in your figure. 
A: Would you like to go on a date with me? 
B: That’s so nice, but I’m busy 
A: Wait, I didn’t tell you when the date is. Friday, 6 pm 
B: I’m still busy 
I.M: 1. I do not want to go on a date with you. 
A: Aren’t you afraid of getting hurt? 
B: Well, not unless I date a great white shark 
I.M: 1. White sharks can be harmful. 
A: Cool shirt 
B: Thanks […] 
A: I was being sarcastic. You look stupid 
B: […] Jacket or no jacket? […] 
A: As many jackets as you can  
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I.M: 1. Your t-shirt is horrible, so, if you put a jacket on it, people won’t see it. 
A: Hi. So, I saw that we had a biology test coming up and, I don’t know, I was just 
thinking that maybe we could study together 
B: Why would I want to do that? I’m getting an “A” in Biology and you’re getting an 
“A” minus. That would not benefit me at all 
I.M: 1. I do not want to study with you. 
A: I asked a girl out 
B: Oh, I’m sorry 
A: Why? 
B: I assumed she said no 
A: No, she said yes 
B: Really? Oh, I’m sorry for her 
I.M: 1. He is not really the perfect guy to date. 
A: Are your parents cool with me coming to dinner? I’m pretty sure your dad hates me 
B: Yeah, they’re fine with it, ‘cause they don’t know 
I.M: 1. My father hates you, and if he knew that you came he would not let it happen. 
A: You been smoking around my daughter’ 
B: Cigarettes? No 
I.M: 1. He has been smoking something different than cigarettes. 
A: Your shift ended 20 minutes ago. Is everything okay?  
I.M: Why are you still here? 
A: She was born in New Jersey, in the same town as Queen Latifah 
I.M: 1. Queen Latifah was born in New Jersey. 
A: Sam, are you okay with this? 
B: I think it’s dumb, but other people seem to be happy, mostly Paige 
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I.M: 1. I am not okay with this. 
A: Dad, did mom used to touch all your stuff? How did you get her to stop? 
B: I don’t think I ever did 
I.M: 1.Your mother is still touching all my staff. 
A: Hey. You look familiar 
B: I’m black, so they put me on the brochures 
I.M: 1. Black people always appear in brochures. 
A: She got upset because I didn’t tell one of my mates about Sam’s autism. But that’s 
unfair, right? 
B: You don’t want me to take sides 
I.M: 1. That is not unfair, she is right. 
A: My cousin works at a car wash, therefore she knows all about girls 
I.M: 1. People who work at a car wash knows all about girls. 
A: Even Sharice turned against me  
I.M: 1. Sharice is the last person she believes she would turn against her. 
A: I’m such an idiot 
B: I’m sure I’ve seen way more idiotic 
I.M: 1. You are a bit idiot. 
A: I have a free day tomorrow. Can I pick you up from school and we can go and get ice 
cream at Friendly’s like we used to? 
B: I have thinking to do, so being alone is ideal 
I.M: 1. No.  
A: I can’t stop, I’m a machine (a garland-making machine) 
I.M: 1. Machines work without stopping.  
A: Did you break into my house with chocolate-covered strawberries? 
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B: No, the window was open. I just silently climbed in until my dad made me leave 
I.M: 1. Yes, I did break into your house with chocolate-covered strawberries. 
A: Dance with me 
B: I only have two minutes and I don’t like to slow dance  
I.M: 1. No. 
A: You okay? 
B: My mom had an affair 
I.M: 1. I’m not okay. 
A: Sam, you okay? 
B: It’s Monday at 4 o’clock. I always see Julia on Mondays at 4 o’clock 
I.M: 1. I not okay because I want to see Julia. 
A: A hole the size of the state of Maine has been found in the middle of Antarctica  
I.M: 1. The size of the Antarctica is quite larger than that of the state of Maine. 
A: Where is old Dougy? 
B: At my grandpa’s cabin, building a dumb porch 
A: In the middle of the winter? 
I.M: 1. Porches are only used in summer. 
A: I don’t enjoy intimacy with strangers 
B: We are very different people 
I.M: 1. I do enjoy intimacy with strangers. 
A: This is the tightest made bed I’ve ever felt were. You were in the military? 
I.M: 1. People in the military are expert in making their bed. 
A: Did you vacuum the rug? 
B: I woke up early 
I.M: 1. Yes, I did. 
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A: Sam, it’s the first night I’ve ever been apart from you 
I.M: 1. We have been always sleeping together. 
A: An advice incoming, sit down 
B: Good, I was hoping for this, I brought my notebook 
I.M: 1. I use my notebook to write down all his advices. 
A: I need her more than you do 
I.M: 1. You don’t need her. 
A: You walk around with that in your shoes? 
B: It helps my plantar fasciitis 
I.M: 1. Yes, I do. 
A: Baby? Do you have a kid? 
B: Of course not. I’m not a moron. My mother is 
I.M: 1. My mother is a moron because she has a baby. 
A: And you run out of class? 
B: It was too loud 
I.M: 1. Yes, I did. 
A: You’re really good at lying 
B: I learned everything I know from the Dark lord herself. Mom 
I.M: 1. Mom lies a lot.  
A: I don’t know how to lie 
B: You’ve come to the right place. How can I be of service? 
I.M: 1. I am a liar and I can help you.  
A: I need a bank account 
B: Oh, and good day to you, Mr. Rockefeller  
I.M: 1. Because he is rich. 
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A: It’s nice and calm 
B: Yes, you probably won’t have another panic attack here 
I.M: 1. You had another panic attack before. 
A: So, how’s Newton without Newton? 
B: I don’t know, I actually go to the technical school  
A: But he’s really smart 
I.M.: 1. People at the technical school are not smart. 
A: My dad built an igloo. Way better than his last one.  
I.M.: The last one was not good enough.  
A: These are my pop shoes, that way no one knows it’s me in the bathroom, ‘cause they 
don’t see my shoes under the stall 
B: Those look like Bob’s shoes 
A: Exactly 
I.M: 1. Using these shoes people would think I’m Bob. 
A: It’s so impressive that you’re practicing for college. I wish Zahid had gone to college 
I.M: 1. Zahid did not go to college. 
A: You’re my favourite person, but don’t tell Sharice ‘cause she will kill you 
I.M: 1. Sharice would like to be my favourite person.  
A: We never should have stopped inviting you on those trips 
I.M: 1. They have stopped inviting them. 
A: Dude was like 88 years old, such a jerk, and smoke like a chimney 
I.M: 1. Chimneys smoke. 2.He smoke quite a lot. 
A: Can you give me a tattoo of that? 
B: I don’t have the appropriate training or equipment for that. And that room is 
definitely not sterile. I think I saw a cockroach the other day  
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I.M: 1. I don’t want to do it.  
A: Artists are supposed to be eccentric lunatics. You’ve seen that ‘stache on Salvador 
Dali 
I.M: 1. Salvador Dali is an eccentric lunatic because he is an artist. 
A: Contrary to popular belief, being a successful explorer is not about being brave or 
even taking risks 
I.M: 1. People believe that being a successful explorer means being brave and taking 
risks. 
A: And if you are in Antarctica, warm socks 
I.M: 1. In the Antarctica it’s cold. 
A: I have the 3
rd
 highest GPA in the class. Paige has the highest, which is good because 
she’s the one who has to give the speech, not me 
I.M: 1. I do not want to give the speech.  
B: Wait—Are you not wearing anything under there?  
A: So? Zahid didn’t 
I.M: No, I’m not wearing anything under there  
 
